
Even as the United States and Japan demonstrated rare coordination by jointly intervening to buy yen in late July and early August 2026, a core disagreement between US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi over Bank of Japan policy continues to surface. Bessent has for the past year indicated that monetary tightening remains essential to correct the yen’s weakness. Takaichi has repeatedly signaled caution against raising rates too rapidly, citing the need to sustain an economic rebound that has drawn significant investor interest.
The Bank of Japan has increased its benchmark rate twice since Takaichi assumed office in October 2025. The rate currently stands at 1 percent following the June 2026 hike to a 31-year high from 0.75 percent. At its late July meeting the central bank held rates steady even as Japanese authorities conducted large-scale yen purchases and the United States joined the effort. Market data indicated Japan may have sold nearly $59 billion of dollars for yen in the period surrounding the coordinated action, while a photograph from a US cabinet meeting showed a notepad in front of Bessent listing “Buy Japanese Yen (JPY) $5-10 bil.”
The yen had weakened to around 164 per dollar in late July, its lowest level against the dollar since 1986. Following the joint intervention, the currency strengthened to the mid-157 range. Bessent described the action as countering disorderly movements and stated that the United States would not hesitate to participate in further coordinated intervention. He also noted that Washington remains in close contact with Japanese counterparts at the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. Japanese Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama confirmed the joint purchases and affirmed readiness for additional coordinated steps when necessary.
Bessent has consistently linked yen support to appropriate monetary policy. In earlier comments he expressed confidence that Bank of Japan Governor Kazuo Ueda would guide policy successfully if granted sufficient independence, and he has highlighted the undesirability of excess exchange-rate volatility. Takaichi’s administration has emphasized the importance of aligning monetary policy with government efforts to support growth through fiscal measures, including spending packages and investment initiatives. One board member appointed under Takaichi dissented against the June rate increase.
The interest-rate differential with the United States has remained a key factor in yen movements. Japanese authorities have conducted multiple rounds of intervention earlier in 2026, including actions in the spring that involved substantial dollar sales. Bessent has publicly supported Japan’s market and monetary steps to address what he termed the substantial undervaluation of the yen, while also referencing the use of Federal Reserve facilities as a backstop.
Although coverage has centered on the novelty of the joint US-Japan yen purchases as a signal of alliance strength, the Bank of Japan’s decision to hold its policy rate at 1 percent immediately around the time of the intervention limited the durability of the currency’s rebound. The yen subsequently moved back toward 160 per dollar in subsequent trading, according to market participants monitoring the gap between foreign-exchange operations and domestic monetary settings. Official statements from both sides have stressed close communication, yet the pace of rate adjustments has lagged the frequency of verbal and actual interventions.









